Civil-political control over the armed forces turned into a bureaucratic stranglehold
The decline in the governance of defence has become so stark that the armed forces, regarded as the last bastion of democracy, can no longer attract quality youth to join the fourth largest armed forces in the world. Operationally the most intensely committed, the Army alone is short of 11,000 officers. The unthinkable – conscription or national service – was mentioned as a solution by the Chief of Army Staff, Gen Deepak Kapoor, this month.
The civilian bureaucracy is mainly to blame for the degradation in the image and standing of the defence forces and dilution in respect, dignity and emoluments. A large share of the blame has to be borne by the political class. But senior military officers cannot escape responsibility. How did governance of the military come to such a pass?
The malaise can be traced to the time of Independence when defence policy was made by India Office and Whitehall in London. During the British Viceroyalty, in terms of protocol, the Commander-in-Chief was second only to the Viceroy. For the political leadership of independent India, a Defence Ministry was a novel experience as India was used to a Defence Department and a Defence Member of the Viceroy’s Council. The armed forces were pejoratively referred to as toadies. They had not fought for India’s freedom but had been on the other side.
Civil and military bureaucracy that inherited charge had no clue about international relations and national security management. After the end of World War II, the political leadership was too naïve to grasp threats and challenges to
national security. Further, military officers who were rapidly promoted lacked knowledge, experience and competence. Generalist civilian bureaucrats became staff officers rather than professional advisers to politicians.
Added to this was Mahatma Gandhi’s pacifism and non-violence enmeshed in Jawaharlal Nehru’s idealism. Nehru seriously believed that India required a police force and not any military. The British-bred armed forces were always viewed suspiciously by the new political class and the fear of a takeover conditioned their psyche. Topping these infirmities in defence policy was George Tanham’s famous charge that India does not have a tradition of strategic thought.
A major lapse after Independence was the decision of the Service Chiefs to function independently of the Ministry of Defence (MoD),a separation encouraged by the political establishment to ensure the military’s apolitical nature. Thus they opted to stay outside the power and decision-making loop, a choice their successors have rued. This flawed structure of governance led to time and cost overruns and practically no institutionalized mechanism for enunciation and evolution of policy. Civilian bureaucrats call the shots. A desk officer in the MoD still clears the file authorizing travel abroad by a Service Chief.
A major lapse was the decision of the Service Chiefs to function independently of the MoD, a separation encouraged by the political establishment to ensure the military’s apolitical nature. Thus they opted to stay outside the power and decision-making loop
Like the Partition and division of assets, the defence makeover was precipitate. Army Chief Gen KS Thimayya’s articulation about the impossibility of defending India against China on the high Himalaya, the letter by an undersecretary in the MoD to the Army Chief to evict the Chinese from Thagla Ridge, the failure to use the Air Force in 1962, the lack of Army-Air coordination in the 1965 war and so on are benchmarks in misgovernance of defence.
Over time, civil-political control over the armed forces turned into a civilian-bureaucratic stranglehold – not without encouragement from the political leadership. The first step in misgovernance was lowering the Warrant of Precedence of the military. The appointment of C-in-C was dropped and Service Chiefs designated as Chiefs of Staff. In 1947 an officer of the rank of Lieutenant General was ranked above an ICS Secretary to the Government of India which was then the highest post for any ICS officer, a Major General above Chief Secretary of a state, while a Brigadier was above an IG of Police and drew a pension higher than a Secretary’s.
The civilian bureaucrat has ingeniously usurped the politician’s prerogative and accorded himself the distorted inter se precedence vis-a-vis the armed forces. Similar anomalies have been allowed in service for promotion. Today a Brigadier (29 years’ service) is equated in pay and precedence with a DIG (14 years’ service in IPS), a Director (14 years’ service in IAS), a scientist (17 years’ service in DRDO) and a DIG,BSF (20 years’ service). This ill-conceived and illogical equation runs right across the spectrum of rank structure.
The Army has a pyramidical structure for promotions whereas the proliferation of DGs and additional DGs in police is comical. The pay structure benefits Central government officers. They draw an average of Rs 8,000 per month over their personnel in the armed forces. In two other vital areas – honour and respect – the soldier has been run down.
The degrading of the Army has been done consciously through a nexus between political leadership and civilian services. While both are responsible for ensuring the armed forces are sufficiently provided to carry out their mandated tasks for national security, neither is held accountable for any omissions. A decisive military triumph over Pakistan with 93,000 Prisoners of War in 1971 could not be converted into a political and diplomatic victory. On the other hand, in 1999, the Army Chief took the Army into the Kargil war “to fight with what we have” – referring to the deficiencies in strategic equipment.
Defence Minister George Fernandes had to send civilian bureaucrats to Siachen to understand the problems faced by the soldiers. But that will not prevent an IAS officer from the department of Animal Husbandry taking over as Defence Secretary. The Defence Secretary is de facto the fourth Service Chief — the Chief of Defence Staff.
Of the 79 recommendations made by the Group of Ministers after the Kargilwar to streamline higher control of defence and governance in the MoD,59 have allegedly been implemented. Yet, on the ground, the voids remain as key areas have been skipped. The unfavourable separation between service headquarters and the MoD has not been done away with and an integrated Defence Ministry exists only in name. The blame for not appointing a CDS has been shifted from government to the services.
The colonial policy of divide and rule is being exploited. Good governance in defence and national security requires specialists to act as an interface between political and military leadership. The present set-up does not foot the bill.
