Changes in higher defence management show sincerity but the pace is slow
In recent times, India has undertaken a comprehensive review of its security interests and objectives as well as initiated major reforms in the higher defence organizations. The genesis of this effort is traceable to the aftermath of the Kargil war, when the government constituted a committee under the chairmanship of defence analyst K Subrahmanyam to look into the cause of the conflict as well as recommend effective steps for national security management. The Subrahmanyam Committee Report highlighted serious lacuna in the management of the higher defence sector in India and suggested far-reaching changes in organizational set-up.
Subsequently, the government constituted a Group of Ministers’ committee in early 2000,which submitted its report
in February 2001. Titled “Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers”, it is commonly referred to as the GoM Report. The GoM constituted four task forces to undertake a comprehensive view of national security matters. These included task forces on Intelligence Apparatus under the chairmanship of GC Saxena, on Internal Security under the chairmanship of NN Vohra, on Border Management under the chairmanship of Madhav Godbole, and on Management of Defence under the chairmanship of Arun Singh. The last task force deals with matters related to higher defence management.
In order to enhance the efficiency of India’s higher defence management structures and processes, the GoM Report, among others, recommended several broad measures (see box).
The emphasis of the GoM Report on various aspects of national security management deserve examination. The major recommendations have led the government to create and establish quite a few new institutions as well as refine or reorganize defence management structure to cater to both existing and emerging needs and priorities. An analysis of
the impact of such reforms is itself a major exercise. Moves to integrate the Services Headquarters with the MoD, creation of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and its associate structures, establishment of Strategic Forces and Andaman and Nicobar Commands, Defence Intelligence Agency and a few other important institutions in a span of four or five years after the GoM Report was accepted suggest government sincerity in enhancing the national security system management. Although many of the implemented measures like the CDS have been criticized as half-measures by analysts, yet complex structural and organizational aspects of defence management take time to mature and deliver results.
While efforts to bring in reforms in structural-institutional aspects of higher defence management are laudable, a few points deserve consideration. First despite creation of several joint institutions and emphasis on “jointness” in the armed forces, it is noted that the pace of desirable jointness has been slower than anticipated. This is evident in the mindset of both the civil and military bureaucracy on issues like CDS, creation of aerospace command and so on. Unless a common minimum understanding between these bureaucracies is ensured, the political-level decision making will hesitate to approve major joint institutions. Second, creation of institutions is fine, but one must ensure a desirable level of horizontal interaction among such institutions to bring in inter-disciplinary approach to decision making and implementation. Third, reforms in specialized sectors like defence production and procurement must be pursued further. For example, while the defence procurement policy has been revised twice in two years, there are policy related problems within it which need to be addressed. For example, the newly introduced defence offsets policy, revised procurement procedure, and evaluation mechanisms need further refinement to make the policy and procedures more transparent and dynamic.
Fourth, emphasis must be laid on defence planning. As it constitutes one of the most important components of national security, it must be accorded highest priority. Although annual, five year and long-term (15 years) integrated perspective plans exist, one is confronted with the “unspent” syndrome often. There is a need to evolve a mechanism whereby long-term defence plans must be institutionalized as a “constant” process, regardless of whichever government is in power.
Reforms in specialized sectors like defence production and procurement must be pursued further. For example, while the defence procurement policy has been revised twice in two years, there are policy-related problems within it which need to be addressed
And, last but not least, there is a need to incorporate existing and emerging stakeholders in the national security decision-making at appropriate levels. Unfortunately, crucial decisions on defence matters are decided within what is widely known as the “South Block” by stakeholders like the political class, civil and military bureaucracies and the
defence scientific community. It must be realized that the role of existing stakeholders like the academia and the media and emerging stakeholders like the private sector industry are equally important. The latter must be accommodated in the process to expand the scope of defence management and also bring in a multi-disciplinary approach to defence matters.
GOM Report Recommendations
◗ Integration of Service Headquarters into government, which may be designated as “Integrated Headquarters” of the MoD.
◗ Creation of the offices of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS is required to be established for the following reasons:
a) to provide single-point military advice to the government,
b) to administer the Strategic Forces,
c) to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process, and
d) to ensure the required “jointness” in the Armed Forces .
◗ Need to establish a Strategic Forces Command to manage all strategic forces.
◗ Creation of a Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command.
◗ Setting up of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for co-ordinating the functioning of different Service intelligence directorates in Service Headquarters.
◗ Enhancement of “Jointness” in the Armed Forces.
◗ Establishment of institutions like Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), Defence
Procurement Board (DPB), Defence Production Board (DPB) and Defence R&D Board (DRDB).
